Toe-to-toe With the Kremlin: The Fight for a Georgia Free of Russian Influence
A Conversation with Dr. Sergi Kapanadze (Georgia Research Associates, Tbilisi, Georgia)
Wednesday February 19 2025
Speaker: Dr. Sergi Kapanadze
Seminar Title: Georgia’s Peace and Conflicts in the Shadow of Russia
Speaker’s bio: Dr. Sergi Kapanadze is a founder and board director of a Tbilisi-based think tank, Georgia’s Reforms Associates (Grass). Dr. Kapanadze is also Professor of peace studies, international relations and European integration at Ilia State University (Tbilisi) and Jean Monnet Chair at the Caucasus University (Tbilisi), where he also runs the Jean Monnet Center of Excellence – Eutranspol. In 2016-2020, Dr. Kapanadze was a vice-speaker of the Parliament of Georgia from the European Georgia Party.
Author: Lois Seese, Intern at MECACS, graduate of International Relations and Arabic at the University of St Andrews.
A transcript of an interview between MECACS intern, Lois Seese, and Dr. Kapanadze is integrated into this seminar report.
Georgia’s parliamentary elections were held in October 2024. It resulted in the pro-Russian populist party, Georgia Dream, securing a win, although the results were contested by the opposition. The election highlighted one of Georgia’s most vital and consequential political topics: the push-and-pull between Russia and the West. Georgia Dream touted an anti-EU integration agenda as one of their main campaigning points and pushed the narrative that the West is entangling an unwilling Georgia in the conflict by urging them to open a front against Russia. Guest Speaker, Dr. Sergi Kapanadze dove into the context and implications of Georgia’s current, unstable system of governance, and Georgian foreign policy at a time of growing Russian influence, arguably, as a result of the Georgian government’s own action.
Georgia Dream’s biggest concern is self-preservation and the survival of the regime, rather than cooperation with the European Union or cooperation with the international agenda. This categorizes Georgian foreign policy, according to Dr. Kapanadze, as “minimalist and self-isolationist.” The consequences of such foreign policy approach have led to asset-freezing, sanctions, and suspension of strategic partnerships with the US and the UK.
However, Georgia is not entirely economically dependent on Russia. Depending on the year, only five to fifteen percent of Georgia’s energy comes from Russia, and Russia comes second to Azerbaijan as Georgia’s main source of gas. Furthermore, Russia pays a transit fee to Georgia to export gas to Armenia. Electricity-wise, Georgia is dependent on hydroelectricity. So, if Russia wanted to leverage their exports, it would likely not be detrimental to Georgia. Dr. Kapanadze added that twenty percent of Georgia’s export structure is to Russia, mainly in the form of services. Besides Russia, Georgia’s main trading partners are the EU and Turkey.
As discussed in the seminar, Georgia Dream’s narrative of an exploitative West is tantamount to ‘blatant misinformation’, according to Dr. Kapanadze. The EU’s conditions for Georgian membership were outlined in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which requires candidates to act democratically under the rule of law and respect human rights. However, Georgia did not meet the criteria as of 2024 under Georgia Dream’s leadership and lost its candidate status. Rather, Georgia’s system of governance seems to be heavily influenced by the Kremlin, with anti-LQBTQ+ propaganda and laws aimed at supressing dissent which directly replicate those passed by the Russian parliament in previous years.
Georgia’s collective memory and historical contention with Russia further play a significant role in current Russo-Georgian relations and arguably explains the pushback and protest on Georgia Dream’s ‘blind eye’ towards Russian meddling. Dr. Kapanadze recounted the conflict between Georgia and Russia from the early 1990s-2008, highlighting the disputes which were met either with heavy Russian military force or political power and sway. These patterns of Russian power parallel to the ideological and political influence that Russia now has in Georgia’s domestic politics
In the early 1990s, the then Georgian government was met with opposition from South Ossetia and Abkhazia – pro-Russian separatist regions that have long been embroiled in the wider Russo-Georgia conflict. Russia supported both separatist regions and provided military support to weaken Tbilisi and force Georgia back into Russia’s “orbit” and join the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993. An alternation between pro and anti-Russian governments continued for several decades. Nationalist President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted in 1993, and Edward Shevardnadze, a former Soviet foreign minister with strong Russian ties, became President at a time when civil war had made post-independence Georgia a fully dysfunctional state. Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003 and pursued pro-Western policies including pushing for NATO membership up until the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. One result of the 2008 war was Russia formally recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although in practical terms both territories are fully in Russia’s orbit. Georgia’s resistance to Russian influence were exemplified in notable efforts like Eduard Shevardnadze’s Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project in the 1990s. The pipeline connected Azeri oil and gas to Europe via Georgia. This “strategic infrastructure” was an attempt to garner international backing and Western attention. The many moves towards a more autonomous Georgia in 1992-2008 consistently prompted Russian aggression in the form of military or political power, which are clear parallels to Georgia’s current situation.
Dr. Kapanadze provided fascinating insights into Russia’s tools of influence in Georgia over the past several decades and the role that collective memory plays. He highlighted the parallels between the Georgia-Russo military conflicts of 1992 up to 2008 and today’s dynamics. Today, Georgia Dream mimics the Kremlin’s system of governance and puts Georgia on a path to oligarchy. Ultimately, an independent Georgia integrated into the EU and working closely with the West is a step towards a strong and flourishing Georgia, he concluded.
MECACS Intern Lois Seese interviewed Dr. Kapanadze for an in-depth understanding of his individual experiences and opinions as a political figure in Tbilisi’s contentious and uncertain political theatre. The interview transcript below was edited for clarity.
Q: You mentioned the fact that Georgia imports only 20 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Does this benefit the Georgian Dream, as it allows them to avoid choosing between economic reliance on Russia versus the West?
A: Yes, I was talking about energy dependence. We have been in the vicinity of between 5 and 15 percent in the last 15 years or so. We’ve never gone beyond that. (The main source) is Azerbaijan, and Russian only comes deep second. We are not dependent in the terms of leverage. So, if they [Russia] want to cut it, or leverage it out to something else, it’s not a big percentage of our consumption.
Q: How else would you characterise Georgia’s economy; is Russia the main export market or source of investment, and if so, does this provide Russia significant leverage?
A: As regards electricity, Georgia is heavily dependent on hydro, which comes from local production. We are not dependent on the imports of Russian electricity, like the majority of the countries that neighbour Russia. In the months when there is excess, we also export it. In the last 12 years, the dependence on Russia in terms of numbers has increased but I wouldn’t call it a dramatic dependence. In terms of giving more leverages to Russia on gas wars, before 2012, part of the Russian gas that was coming to Georgia was a part of a deal that Russia and Georgia had among each other. Because Russia transports the gas to Armenia, and they were paying the transit fee with gas, effectively cutting the gas to Georgia would have meant also cutting the gas to Armenia. Now, they pay us for the transit with money and then we use that money to buy the gas that we need from Russia. Then, obviously because it’s decoupled from the Armenian consumption, that sort of gives more leverage to Russia.
As for the “general” (Georgia market), they export infrastructure, so about. 20 percent of its exports are to Russia, but it has been increasing, because in 2012 we were under the full embargo from Russia in terms of our exports. If you look at the main source of exports, the secondary cars, and then it will be agricultural products. In terms of economy, Georgian economy is not really an export-oriented economy, it is mainly services, it is mainly tourism. And the main trading partners are Turkey, Russia, and the European Union.
Q: Am I correct in understanding, generally, that Georgian policy from the 1990s roughly to 2008 could be described as anti-Russian? If that’s the correct understanding, how would you summarise that serious shift in policy?
A: It was. Shevardnadze was never a pro-Russian politician, and he came as a former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. But after the break-up of the Soviet Union, he returned to Georgia where he used to serve as the First Secretary of the local Communist Party. So, he was in charge of Georgia for 13 years before he moved on to serve as Foreign Minister. So, he knew the country quite well. He returned because of the coup d’état of 1991-1992. There was real instability, and he was the face of the new Georgia. He understood that ‘sticking with Russia’ was not the best strategy and was effectively forced to join the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) as leverage for him to maintain power because he, at that time, was fighting two conflicts where the Russians were supporting separatist groups [in Abkhazia and South Ossetia]. These conflicts were fuelled by Russia. At the same time, he had an internal problem because there was a group of Russian supporters on the rise. They were challenging him. So, the deal which was made basically was that the Russians and the Russian Black Sea fleet, which was stationed on territory of Ukraine, helped one another to maintain power and the price for that was the ceasefire in Abkhazia and then joining the CIS, which he did reluctantly. But he never really turned Georgia into a pro-Russian country. And then he was ousted because of the widespread corruption, and the next government was adamantly anti-Russian. During 2008-2012 we did not have a pro-Russian government. In fact, all the attempts for Russia to have their people in the government within the security minister, among others, did not work out. The Georgian administration drove quite an independent foreign security policy during that time.
Q: Is the Georgia Dream pro-Russian? Or, rather, is there a covert pro-Russian agenda?
A: There are different stages to the Georgia Dream being in power. First, the government is run by an oligarch who made his fortune in Russia. His way of governing, his style, and his value system is very much Russian. He came to power in 2012 in a coalition, it was not only him single-handedly overturning the system. There were a lot of parties who were ardently pro-Western and anti-Russian. We also had a sort of ‘hangover’ from the 2008 Russian invasion so to steer towards Russia immediately was impossible. Effectively he did that over time. In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, he became clearly pro-Russian. It is not necessarily pro-Russian ideology, but it suits his quest to stay in power at all costs. By now, they [Georgia Dream] have embraced the Kremlin’s talking points, they have embraced the disinformation campaign.
Q: You had mentioned there was an attempt from Georgia to garner European attention through leveraging oil and gas around 2008. Can you elaborate more on what this looked like?
A: I think what I was talking about was that it was when Shevardnadze in the nineties, together with Heydar Aliyev initiated the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BCT) project, which was the pipeline connecting the Azeri oil and gas to Europe via Georgia, and that became an important strategic infrastructure because the delivery of hydrocarbons through the Caucuses was going to happen through Georgia. It also included the entry of the British petroleum and others in the region, and sort of raised the attention for the European Union. In 2008 the biggest issue at the time was the (Russo-Georgian) war. It posed a threat to this infrastructure, for this pipeline. There was a real danger that if the war had continued, then the pipeline would have been damaged, which we all know is in the interest of Russia because for them, this route was never the favourable route because it takes the pressure off Russia. The pipeline was supposed to go in the Northern Caucasus, in Russian territory. In fact, the theory is that there were two attempts to murder Mr. Shevardnadze in the nineties, and they were both linked, in a way, to Russia, and their willingness to stop this new infrastructure being built.
Q: When you talk about Georgia not pursuing EU integration, what are some significant examples of the Georgia Dream in the past couple of years rejecting EU conditions? For example, you talked about Georgia’s failure to implement article 49, what specific laws or actions can you recall that may have violated Article 49?
A: There were very specific demands put forward by the EU. In 2022, they said ‘here are the twelve conditions that you have to implement.’ Those were mainly conditions like judiciary court and electoral reform, protection of human rights, independence of media, and the sanctity of the State institution or the Parliament. This is what I would say are like the regular demands that the EU poses to all the countries. And there was one demand, which was also a bit specific, but that was also a demand which was true for Ukraine and Moldova. And that was the demand for the ‘de-oligarchisation.’
So, what does that exactly mean? Georgia only met three conditions. When Georgia obtained the candidate status in 2023 it was only because of the caveats. There were very specific things that the EU demanded from Georgia, and it was mainly related to democratic conditionality. Making Georgia more democratic, that was the goal. The government could not do that, obviously, because those reforms would have meant their power would have become weaker. They opted for a ‘safer’ approach, where they just said, ‘we’re going to stop seeking membership by 2028.’ And that’s what has led to the crisis and protests right now.
Q: What kind of ‘dissent’ can exist within the oligarchic system?
A: I think it’s quite clear. We have a system which has been built, which is dominated by the rich individual, whose wealth is about 1/3rd of the country’s GDP. It’s quite clear that he is the guy that has built the system of governance, which is based on loyalists, a party which is completely centralised, and he has managed to cleanse the party of every dissenting opinion of (dissenting) political leader. He has total dominance of the institutions: the courts, the judiciary, the local council. He’s attacking the NGO’s, attacking the free media, arresting, and attacking the opposition leaders.
Also, the deviation from the country’s longstanding foreign policy orientated toward the West, is another proof because the only one who benefits if him. He will stay in power as a result. There’s neither the public support nor any other justification for that sort of detour from the country’s foreign policy. The laws and the governance practices that he’s been importing are the ones that are very particular to the oligarchic systems that have been tested well in Russia, in Moldova, any other places where oligarchy is predicted.
Q: You said that Russia promotes a narrative that there is a choice between good, weak governance and bad, but strong governance. Outside of Russia, do you see this narrative anywhere else in the world? If you were in charge, what narrative would you promote?
A: The best way to deal with that is to counter the narrative and the disinformation. The Russian narrative has not been that they are better, it’s been that everybody else is bad. So, Russia has never argued that their governance system is the best, they just argue that this is the strongest, that they need to protect the Christian orthodox values. It’s not true, simply because if you look at any criteria, what they claim to be the bedrock of Christianity, whether it is the family, divorce rates, whatever, Russia is leading in all those statistics. Whether it’s drug addiction, or divorce, or teenage pregnancy, or incest-related crime, whatever they claim is actually prospering in Russia.
So, countering that, and having a ‘whole society’ approach when dealing with that narrative is the best way to do that. We are in a unique situation because the government does not counter that, they actually embrace it, and uses the same arguments to strengthen their position. It’s a matter of freedom of speech, and busting those myths, and creating an alternative narrative which is basically about human nature and the so-called ‘pursuit of happiness.’ A narrative that, any person who wants to pursue that happiness, in the system that Russia has built, it is just not possible. You can either be arrested or jailed or kicked out of the country or sent to the frontlines and killed, without anybody asking of your opinion. The facts speak for themselves. You just need to have a system in which these facts become more accessible to people.