Exploring the Azerbaijani National Identity: a historical analysis
By George Meneshian*
*George Meneshian is a postgraduate student at the University of St Andrews (MLitt Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia Security Studies). He holds a bachelor’s degree on International, European and Area Studies from the Panteion University. He is the Research Coordinator of the Foreign Policy, Defence and Security Task Group at the Centre for Russia, Eurasia and North-eastern Europe (Institute of International Relations). Furthermore, he is a member and study contributor at the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (HELISS). He also is a regular contributor (weekly foreign affairs analysis) to the Greek news website ‘liberal.gr’ and has published several articles and minor studies in various academic publications, electronic newspapers, and blogs. He is co-author of the book “The Greek-Albanian Relations: problems and perspectives” (2020). He speaks Greek, Armenian, English, and French.
Τhe recent Armenian – Azerbaijani war over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, crystallised the extent of the patriotic/nationalistic enthusiasm of Azerbaijanis. This mobilisation of the people of Azerbaijan, makes the research on Azerbaijani identity and its evolution over the years quite interesting. Did Azerbaijanis always have a strong national sentiment? How was their identity formed in what it is today? There is a dispute regarding the ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijani people which has led to the rise of two theories: the first advocates that Azerbaijanis are the descendants of the Oghuz Turks who emigrated en masse from Central Asia to the Caucasus and mixed with the indigenous Caucasian and Iranian peoples [1]. According to the second theory, contemporary Azerbaijanis are the descendants of the Turkified local Caucasian Albanian and Iranian peoples [2]. In any case, the Azerbaijanis belong to the Turkic peoples (Ibid).
Until 1918, when the Azerbaijani Republic gained its de facto independence, the Azerbaijani people were referred to as Tatars or Caucasian Tatars [3]. Hence, there was no concept of an Azerbaijani nation. The first attempt in creating a national identity among the Tatars took place during the 1905 Revolution and the Armenian-Tatar clashes [4]. Before the Great War, the Azerbaijani intelligentsia had already embraced Turkism and Pan-Turkism [5]. The intellectuals tried to consolidate thisTurkic consciousness of the populace (Ibid) in order to proceed into shaping anational identity. The Müsavat Party was the main Azerbaijani nationalist and Pan-Turkist party albeit it also relied on religion; in its first congress the members formulated the party’s programme: the programme was referring to ‘the unity’ and ‘independence of the Muslim nations’ [6]. Moreover, the motto of the founder of the First Republic of Azerbaijan, Muhammad Amin Rasulzade, was “Turkify, Islamisize, Europeanize” [7]. It is clear therefore, that the Azeri ‘nationalists’ were Pan-Turkists and Pan-Islamists [8]; thus, they mainly embraced a supra-state identity rather than a strict state one.
Nevertheless, in 1918 the Müsavatists declared the Republic of Azerbaijan [6] and claimed parts of Transcaucasia [5]. The territory on which the new republic was established, lied north of the river Araxes. This area was never referred to as ‘Azerbaijan’ until 1918 [9]. It was known as Arran or (Caucasian) Albania. Azerbaijan was the north-western province of Persia [8]. The Azerbaijani nationalists chose this name because they aspired to a union between the newly established republic and Persian Azerbaijan, given that the residents of both regions belonged to the same nation. The population of northern Persia, however, did not aspire to secedeand did not embrace the Müsavat and Young Turk – promoted Pan-Turkism [5]. The ideology of the ruling elite of the first Republic of Azerbaijan had evolved from pan-Islamism to Turkism and then to ‘Azerbaijanism’. However, the masses did not embrace this ideology, preferring the usual Muslim identity. The idea of an Azeri nation-state did not take root among the majority of the country’s population (Ibid)and, anyway, in April 1920, the Soviets occupied Azerbaijan.
In the early Soviet years, the Azerbaijani identity had essentially vanished. People continued to identify themselves as just Muslims. Family, clan, and tribal identities were also important [1]. The lack of an Azerbaijani identity was obvious; the official language of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (SSRA) during the period 1922-1956 was the Turkish language [10]. However, in the 1930’s, the Stalinist regime sought the construction of an Azerbaijani national identity in order to stop the potential Turkish influence in Azerbaijan (Ibid). Most scholars agree that the concept of the Azerbaijani nation was affected by both European Romantic nationalism and Soviet policy – making [11]. Nevertheless, the formation of an Azerbaijani national identity was not a simple process; the change of script during the 20th century, for instance, from Arabic to Latin, to Cyrillic and then finally back to Latin caused an “identity crisis” for the speakers of the Azerbaijani language (Ibid).
On August 31, 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence [6]. During the first years,the regime continued the country’s ongoing process of “identity building” [1]. In this context president Heydar Aliyev adopted a new nation-building formula based on“Azerbaijanism”, trying to portray Azerbaijanis as a nation with ancient history and authentic national identity [12]. This Azeri nationalism was not ethnic but territorial [11]. The Aliyev regime (especially following the rise of Ilham to power) tried to connect the contemporary Azerbaijanis with the ancient peoples who inhabited Azerbaijan. It portrays Caucasian Albanians as the ancestors of the modern Azeris. In this context the regime promoted the idea that the churches and monasteries in Azerbaijan (including Karabakh) are Albanian and not Armenian. The same rhetoric is adopted in regard to the northern Iranian peoples that historically inhabited Azerbaijan; the regime started a campaign to brand the country as the “Land of Fire”. It tried, therefore, to connect modern Azerbaijan to the ancient Iranian peoples who invented Zoroastrianism in what is today Azerbaijan [13]. Moreover, the regime has successfully managed to forge a compact national identity by soliciting ‘national pride’ through the winning of contests or by hosting important events [14]. All the above contributed to the definition of Azerbaijanis not by ethnicity but rather by their link to a territorial nation-state [11]. This weaker sense of ethnic identity is a result of the historical diversity of the population (Ibid).
One factor that played a crucial role in the formation of an Azerbaijani identity was the loss of Nagorno Karabakh and its surrounding territories in the 1991-1993 war. For Azeris, Nagorno Karabakh is of significant historical and cultural importance [15]. The war mobilised the Azeris who demanded from their government theprotection of their land [16]. The motto of the protesters was the protection of the territorial unity of Azerbaijan [17]. The public was further mobilised following the Khojali massacre [18]. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict eventually enhanced the territorial concept of the nation and not the Azerbaijani ethnic nationalism because of its focus on geographical boundaries [19]. This was an outcome of the regime – sponsored territorial nationalism. After the war, the regime created narratives with the purpose of increasing the hatred and fanaticism of the Azeris against the Armenians – Armenian governments followed the same policies to mobilise their citizens [20]. Nationalist rhetoric, the feeling of injustice, and the anti-Armenian sentiment made the Azerbaijani national identity stronger by reflection.
However, there are some exceptions to this newly built national identity. Many members of the ethnic minorities (e.g., the Lezgin and the Talysh), have not been fully assimilated into the Azerbaijani nation [21], though studies indicate that, in some cases, large parts of minority population were successfully assimilated [22]. The regime tried to incorporate them by promoting territorial over ethnic nationalism [11]. The Azerbaijani political elite denounced ethnic nationalism fearing that it wouldincite separatism as it did in Nagorno Karabakh. Despite all the above issues, territorial nationalism is widely accepted in Azerbaijan (Ibid).
Since the 1990’s, Pan-Turkism has returned to Azerbaijan (Ibid) challenging territorial nationalism. Azeri nationalist and Pan-Turkist leader Ebulfez Elcibey rose to power to 1992 [11] but he was replaced in 1993 by Heydar Aliyev. TheAzerbaijanis feel close to the Turks because of their cultural and linguistic ties, albeit they have more cultural similarities with the Caucasian peoples [17]. However, Aliyev was committed to imposing the territorial nationalism state ideology. Nevertheless, the phrase “one nation, two states” is still widely used by both the Turkish and the Azeri citizens, media, and politicians [15].
Another type of identity is described by ‘yerlicilik’ (literally meaning favouring local ties) which is akin to a tribal identity [17]. The regime must carefully distribute wealth in order to satisfy every single region and its population. Tokluoglu advocates that regional identities and regionalism are far more important than ethnic divisions and they shape political identities in Azerbaijan. Consequently, Azerbaijan is a typical post-Soviet state regarding its regional and clan identities.
Lastly, an important factor affecting identity is religion. Notwithstanding the state – sponsored secularism, Azerbaijan is a Muslim country with a Shia majority and an increasing Sunni minority [23]. This divide, however, is artificial, according to some analysts, because the majority identifies itself by religion and not by sect [24].Secularism in Azerbaijan does not stand in contrast to Islamic identity (Ibid). There is, however, a tendency towards the Islamisation of the society though this process is slow. It is, nevertheless, going to affect the identity of Azerbaijanis at some point [23].
The struggle of forming a compact national identity in Azerbaijan was successful thanks to the choices of the ruling Aliyev family and the myths the regime builtaround the Azerbaijani nation. Since the eve of the 20th century, Azeris had many identities (Muslim, Turkic, Soviet) but the territorial-national (Azerbaijani) identity was the one that prevailed. The rhetoric of ‘Azerbaijanism’ as well as the impact of the Nagorno Karabakh War empowered the notion of a common identity among the Azerbaijani people. However, this identity faces challenges after the return of Pan-Turkism and Islam following the restoration of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1991. This case study shows the importance of leadership on successfully shaping the identity of the people. In Azerbaijan, the Aliyev regime’s policies of identity-building prove to be efficient. To this day, Heydar Aliyev is portrayed as the ‘father of the nation’ [25]. While such a concept is now shared by many Azeris, the extent this belief has truly spread in society remains to be proved.
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