Impact of Regime Policies on the Rise of Sectarian Violence: Case of Syria

Ondrej Palicka is postgraduate student of Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia Security Studies at the University of St Andrews. Besides, he is a Political Risk Analyst at the Atlas Institute for International Affairs and an intern at the Israel/Palestine Center for Regional Initiatives. 

The Syrian civil war will soon enter its tenth year, but its end still does not seem near. Soon after the war began, it became increasingly characterised by sectarian violence, which divided the Syrian population, and which will arguably make post-war reconciliation more difficult. However, to address this issue, it is necessary to go beyond simply seeing sectarian divisions as the cause of the conflict and analyse how the sectarianisation of the conflict came about. Therefore, this article will examine the impact of regime policies on the rise of sectarian violence in Syria.

Syria is a highly heterogenous country; as of 2010, its population consisted of Sunni Arabs (65%), Kurds (15%), Alawites (10%), Christians (5%), Druze (3%), Ismailis (1%), and Shia (1%). Thus, one could argue that the sectarian divisions played a major role in the emergence of the civil war which saw violence between the different groups and the rise of extremist organisations such as the Islamic State. Yet, when Bashar’s father Hafiz was met with the Muslim Brotherhood uprising, the group failed to mobilise the Sunni Arab population and the uprising ended in failure. Hence, the question is why did one uprising lead to increased sectarian violence and a civil war, while the other failed to mobilise support despite forceful reaction from the regime?

There are different approaches to the study of sectarian violence, with primordialism and instrumentalism being the most prominent. However, as these have been criticised for being insufficient in analysing violent conflict between sects, different approach will be adopted in this article. Instead of sectarianism, which is a term that lacks clear definition, this article utilises a concept of sectarian identity, as defined by Haddad. Sectarian identity can be viewed as a continuum that marks to what level an individual identifies with a group and how susceptible to violence they are, ranging from banal to militant sectarian identity. The two terms come from the work written by R. Hinnebusch where he identifies them as the variations of sectarianism. As identity is fluid and can be reproduced through social and political processes, one’s identification can move between the opposing poles of the continuum. These processes, such as discrimination, can influence identity on different levels, ranging from individual to global. While it can be influenced by different actors on different levels simultaneously, this article will focus on the state level, i.e., the Assad regimes’ policies. 

First and foremost, sectarian identity has been strengthened and reproduced during the Ottoman Empire and has become politicised under the French mandate and the Assad regime. In the interwar period, sectarian identities were reproduced at the expense of national ones. Subsequently, when Assad ascended to power, he promoted Arab nationalism, however, sectarian identities were already rooted in society and their reproduction within some segments of society was stimulated by the regime’s dependence on neo-patrimonialism, which neglected some groups – in this case primarily urban and merchant population which was predominantly Sunni. Thus, despite Assad’s efforts to co-opt parts of Sunni population, which were arguably successful, some people still resented the regime and perceived it as Alawi dominated. Based on this, it is fair to assume that neo-patrimonialism is inherently discriminatory, especially in heterogenous countries like Syria, and as such always reproduces sectarian identity. But, while Hafiz gave some of the most important positions to Sunnis and created a broad support base, his son adopted different approach.

Hafiz stabilised the regime by co-opting Sunnis and drawing support from rural areas and the predominantly Sunni peasant population – in contrast, Bashar removed his father’s Sunni supporters from power and installed individuals from his own family, making the regime more Alawi-dominated. As Philips argues, rather than being Alawi, Hafiz’ regime was ‘run by some Alawites’. Hence, as many Sunni networks were loyal to the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to mobilise larger portion of population and, without sufficient support, was eventually defeated. When Bashar came to power, his changes in the composition of the ruling elite had two major impacts. Firstly, he lost the important base of support that backed his father during the uprising. Secondly, he strengthened the perceived dominance of Alawites in the regime, fuelling the feeling of discrimination among Sunni population that moved them closer to the militant end of sectarian identity continuum. This was further exacerbated by Bashar’s economic reforms. 

While Hafiz pursued socialism and focused on the country’s poor, Bashar abandoned the Ba’athist ideology and switched to a market economy, further alienating the people. Thanks to the former’s approach, many Sunnis did not feel they were being discriminated against and remained at the banal end of the identity continuum. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood could not easily mobilise them based on the sectarian division. In contrast, this constituency became impoverished by Bashar’s reforms which favoured the urban population. This rift was further widened by the fact that the new business elite, which was predominantly Alawi, ostentatiously displayed its wealth. Hence, yet again, discrimination pushed many Sunnis closer to the militant identity. Furthermore, Islam’s role in society changed. 

Hafiz’s policies were nationalist, secular, and non-sectarian in nature, however, after the end of the Muslim Brotherhood uprising, he started to promote Islam – a strategy that was continued by Bashar. On the one hand, such an approach might have reconciled some of the more conservative Sunnis and added to the fostering of moderate Islam. On the other hand, it also might have helped to reproduce religious identity at the expense of national identity. For example, as was previously mentioned, the state stopped providing welfare to the disadvantaged due to changes in its ideology which led to the end of the Ba’athists social contract. These activities were taken over by NGOs and charities, many of which were religious. The most prominent among them, The Zayd movement, was able to emerge as a ‘charitable empire’ and enjoyed significant support and influence. Hence, it might be argued that Islamic identity played an increasingly important role in comparison to national identity. However, while national identity serves as a uniting factor, transcending regional, tribal, and sectarian divisions, religious identity entrenches these divisions. The question is if and how the regime addressed sectarian identity during the uprisings.

Hafiz regime’s discourse played a crucial role in preventing a full-blown sectarian conflict. From the onset, the Muslim Brotherhood uprising was framed as sectarian and the group spread sectarian propaganda – however, the regime remained strictly secular in its discourse. Van Dam argues that the regime refrained from religious arguments because it was secular and because it would confirm the allegations that the regime was dominated by Alawites, which would most likely stimulate sectarian antagonism. Instead, as the Brotherhood relied primarily on the urban class, the regime portrayed the insurgency “as an attempt by urban interests to reverse the land reform” (Hinnebusch, 2015; p. 11) with the aim of mobilising the Sunni peasants. In addition, the Supreme State Security Court stated that the uprising was orchestrated by imperialists and Zionists. Therefore, the regime succeeded in promoting its socialist and non-sectarian message, preventing the majority of Sunnis from sliding towards the militant sectarian identity, and denying the Muslim Brotherhood the chance to gain more followers for their cause. However, Bashar chose to go down the opposite path.

In contrast, Bashar decided to rely on Alawi solidarity and employed a sectarian discourse to rally support. At first, after the protests started and were geographically limited, Assad promised certain reforms in his first speech that addressed the protests and he blamed external conspiracy for inciting the uprising – the same strategy that his father adopted. Yet, while announcing reforms, the regime simultaneously cracked down on protesters around the country. The regime was using crack troops, perceived as Alawi, and minority militias to suppress the rebellion, often targeting Sunni mosques that sheltered the protesters, and entire Sunni districts. These troops often displayed community identifiers, such as tattoos, which showed that they were Alawi. Moreover, videos of Alawites torturing Sunnis, whether real or fabricated, circulated on social media. Furthermore, as the protests were spreading around the country, Assad was shifting his discourse more towards the sectarian strife, depicting protesters as al-Qaeda terrorists. His aim was to create a shared threat perception among the Alawites and other minorities, none of whom wanted a new system ruled by Sunni extremists, in order to ensure support for the existing powers structure. This rhetoric was coupled with a depopulation campaign which aimed to force Sunni population out of towns by using artillery shelling, air strikes and massacres of Sunni villages. Arguably, this strategy was a major factor that contributed to people’s slide toward the militant end of sectarian identity continuum which resulted in a sectarianization of the civil war and was a decisive factor in different outcomes of the two uprisings.  

To summarise, four major factors that contributed to different outcomes of the two uprisings can be identified: 1) Bashar dismissed some of the Sunni elite and installed more Alawites, 2) his economic reforms impoverished significant portion of the population, 3) Islam started to play more prominent role, and 4) the regime adopted sectarian narrative.

Although Bashar’s changes and economic reforms led to stronger perception of discrimination, the popular protests ensued because of repression and economic hardships, cutting through sectarian divisions and uniting protesters from different groups. Therefore, it seems that sectarianization of the conflict might have been averted had the regime avoided the sectarian discourse. However, as Bashar exploited the divisions that were broadened in previous years, he effectively caused the sectarianization of the conflict, although arguably aided by actors on other levels as well.