Orange wines and Rose Revolutions

Jake Eisenecker is a MECACS postgraduate student having completed his undergrad in International Relations at St Andrews last year. He counts wine and Eurasian security as two of his main passions.

​The country of Georgia possesses a rich and illustrious wine-making tradition. Fertile soils and a favourable climate provide ideal conditions to produce red, white, and distinctive amber wines. Although modern techniques are commonplace, many winemakers preserve traditional methods, aging wine underground in large clay vessels known as Qvevris. Georgian wines were once highly prized in the Soviet Union and Russian demand has endured since. Yet, despite this fondness, relations between Tbilisi and Moscow have been characterised by animosity, distrust and frequent deadlock. Perhaps surprisingly, Georgian wine has featured prominently in these relations.

In the wake of the 2003 Rose Revolution, Tbilisi began to pursue closer connections with the West. Meanwhile, diplomatic relations with Moscow deteriorated leading to an import ban on Georgian wine in 2006. Ostensibly motivated by quality and safety concerns, the move was undoubtedly designed to castigate Georgia by wounding a major industry: some producers exported as much as 90% of their output to Russia. The halted flows of Georgian wine preceded full-blown diplomatic crisis in 2008 as war erupted over the Russian-backed breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Despite direct conflict being brought to a ceasefire, relations remained extremely hostile.

In 2012, the newly-elected Georgia Dream Party expressed the desire to normalise relations with Russia. Diplomatic channels were reopened and previously-cancelled direct flights resumed. In 2013, the 7-year ban on Georgian wine was lifted and Russian thirst was quenched once more.

Despite this initial rapprochement, Georgian-Russian relations had little time to breathe before souring once again. Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained points of contention and Georgians have neither forgotten nor forgiven what they perceive as the illegal occupation of Georgian soil by Russian troops. In 2019, significant protests began in Tbilisi afterSergey Gavrilov, a Russian member of parliament taking part in an assembly promoting relations between Christian Orthodox countries, gave a speech from the Speaker of Parliament’s seat. Praising the close relationship between Russia and Georgia, in Russian, from the most significant seat in Georgia’s parliament, was viewed by many as an attack on Georgian sovereignty. Thousands of outraged protestorsresponded by storming parliament and demanding political reform. Moscow labelled the demonstrations a “Russophobic provocation”, renewed travel restrictions, and tightened regulations on Georgian wine while threatening further restrictions.

Controls on Georgian wine have therefore paralleled broader Russian attitudes towards Georgia. For Moscow, a western leaning Tbilisi manifests an immediate threat in the‘near abroad’, once firmly in the orbit of the Soviet Union. Russia is particularly suspicious of NATO and the EU, regarding both organisations as tools of Western expansion which aim to subvert Russian influence. Although Georgia has sought membership within both organisations, NATO is fundamentally a military alliance and thus constitutes an issue of principal concern to Moscow. Georgian cooperation withNATO is already high, most recently formalised in 2016 underthe Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP). Alongside Ukraine, Georgia is one of NATO’s most “valued partners” in the post-Soviet space, something Moscow is acutely aware of. Moreover, with widespread domestic support, Georgia’s ascension to full membership appears imminent.

For Moscow, Georgian ascent would deal a major blow to national security, firmly entrenching anti-Russian sentiment in its own backyard. Moscow is right to be apprehensive;increased cooperation has already led to a growing presence of American troops on Georgian soil. Furthermore, NATO conferences have explicitly identified Russia as a rival and addressed Russian “military buildup” as a threat.

Seeking to deter closer relations with the West, Russia’s banning of Georgian wine aims to achieve a number of objectives. It firstly serves to exert economic pressure, denying access to a significant market and demonstrating the value of Russian trade to the Georgian economy. It also avoids the severe consequences that military action would bring while still signalling Russian discontent. Moreover, by targeting a specific industry under the guise of quality control, Moscow can assert its actions to be apolitical, motivated by regulatory standards and safety guidelines. Reports of insufficient quality control and violated safety protocols are published through Russia’s consumer watchdog, Rospotrebnadzor, distancing restrictions from the Kremlin and legitimising the issue as one of public health. Following the most recent provocations, Russian officials were quoted saying “there’s no political conflict here”. For these reasons, trade sanctions have been a favoured tool, and often indicative of Moscow’s political will; similar restrictions have previously been placed on Moldovan wine, Belarussian milk,and Ukrainian chocolate, to name a few.

Regardless of these intended goals, banning Georgian wine has ultimately proved counter-productive. The 2006 sanctions failed to coerce Georgia and were detrimental to Russia’s objectives. Despite a short-term loss in revenue, the ban did little to prove economic dependency, instead leading Georgia to re-orientate towards new western markets- the United States and Britain are two of Georgia’s largest growing export destinations. Further threats of renewed sanctions in 2019 caused producers to look beyond Russia once more, leading exports to drop by 27% compared to the previous year, while exports to the United States surged by an astonishing 88% in the first half of the year. Unsurprisingly, export levels to Russia have never returned to pre-2006 levels.

​These trends suggest the future of Georgia’s wine industry will be closely aligned with the West, and it seems likely Georgia’s foreign relations will follow a similar trajectory. The deepening of relations and progress towardsfull NATO membership is likely to continue under President Biden. Biden outlined his vision for an American-led multilateral foreign policy. Given his promise to “counter Russian aggression”, Washington will undoubtedly be more confrontational towards Moscow than the previous administration. The President has already vowed to strengthen the capacity of NATO, believing it to be “at the very heart of the United States’ national security”. This will almost certainly involve a greater commitment to Georgia, making a more proactive push for NATO membership all but inevitable. The appointment of Victoria Nuland- an ardent proponent of Russian containment- as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is a further sign that the Biden administration will not avoid future confrontation with the Kremlin.

That being said, Biden inherits a critically divided nation, wrought with profoundly complex social and political issues; not to mention the ongoing coronavirus pandemic which still requires an enormous effort to surmount. Consequently, it is unlikely that Georgia will be high in the agenda and it remains to be seen whether campaign rhetoric will manifest any concrete policy decisions.

​The next decade is therefore uncertain for Georgia. Protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity will remain central to national security and endure as the guiding principles of foreign policy. Abkhazia and South Ossetia will continue to be paramount and constitute the largest obstacles to normalizing relations with Russia. Although Georgia has committed itself to a peaceful resolution, Russia is yet to follow suit and remains unyielding in support of both regions. At present, relations are a zero-sum game and for any significant gains to be made, Moscow must reconsider its strategy. Attempts to strongarm Georgia have born little fruit, only incentivising stronger relations with the West- a trend set to continue under President Biden. Normalisation is therefore in the Kremlin’s best interest, creating opportunities for cooperation and bolstering Russian security. Although rapprochement is undoubtedly difficult, it is not impossible. Tbilisi has been willing to approve oversights for Russian peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh, suggesting one possible avenue where meaningful progress may be achieved. While the future is uncertain, it will be beneficial to both Russia and Georgia to normalise relations and let wine flow freely between borders.