Relinquishing the bomb

A comparative analysis of Libya and Kazakhstan’s decision to denuclearize

Veerle Schyns

Veerle Schyns is a postgraduate student of Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asian Security Studies at the University of St. Andrews. Prior to studying in St. Andrews, she studied Politics, Psychology, Law and Economics at the University of Amsterdam, where she previously explored her interest in the role of nuclear weapons in international security.

In January 2021, presidents Biden and Putin agreed to extend the New START treaty by five years, after the future of the treaty had been under threat because of former president Trump’s opposition. New START is a treaty concerned with reducing and controlling the number of nuclear warheads possessed by both countries, but its aim does not in any way include the intention to discard nuclear weapons entirely. Is it today, more than thirty years after the Cold War and in a world characterised by rapid technological development, not remarkable that the nuclear debate remains alive? Why are the leaders of the world’s most powerful countries still debating the number of weapons, rather than aiming to eliminate them altogether? 

​The grand total of 13.410 nuclear weapons still present on our soil, enough to destroy the world multiple times over, clearly indicates a widespread reluctance amongst nuclear weapon states to disarm entirely. The most prominent explanation for this unwillingness is the “conventional wisdom” that nuclear weapons are a crucial element of the state’s security system, because they can counter threats that cannot be countered through other means. Contrary to this trend, however, there are also countries that have voluntarily decided to give their nuclear weapons up, in spite of the theoretical prediction that nuclear disarmament harms their security. This article investigates the decision-making of the latter group, trying to understand the ulterior motivations of countries who dared to counter the theoretical prediction and voluntarily chose to relinquish the bomb. A thorough understanding of these motivations is crucial in striving towards a non-nuclear world. By investigating the case studies of denuclearization in Libya and Kazakhstan, this article finds that, even though the act of giving up nuclear weapons in itself appears to conflict with security, state security is the overall driving force of denuclearization.

Most discussions of nuclear (non-)proliferation are seen in light of the ‘Waltz-Sagan’ debate. In this case however, both Waltz’ and Sagan’s opinions, located on opposite ends of the nuclear debate, are not useful in understanding the nuclear decision-making of states because both focus on opposite explanations and hence fail to provide a holistic security consideration. This article, on the contrary, focuses more on the middle ground of the nuclear debate. In this regard, the model introduced by Cortright & Väyrynen (2009) is much more appropriate. They introduce a model through which to understand denuclearization that takes both the internal and external circumstances into consideration and is hence useful to grasp states’ nuclear decision-making. They identify three underlying factors common to cases of nuclear reversal: the first factor demonstrates a drastic improvement of a state’s security situation, which leads states to no longer deem nuclear weapons necessary for their protection. Secondly, denuclearization often results from a reorientation of domestic political governance towards the outside world, for example through processes of democratization, economic liberalization and attempts to integrate in the global system. Compromising on their regional nuclear position is often crucial for a state’s inclusion into the international community. The final factor is the presence of external incentives, often offered by great powers. Those incentives are in place to decrease the appeal of nuclear weapons and dissuade a state from becoming or remaining nuclear. All three factors explain a separate consideration of nuclear decision-making, but combined, they inform overall considerations of what is best for the state’s self-survival. How does this apply to the cases of Libya and Kazakhstan, two of the few countries that decided to relinquish their nuclear weapons (program)?

Starting off with Libya, this country actively sought a way into the nuclear world, despite ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1975. President Qadhafi first attempted to purchase a nuclear bomb from China, but when this failed, he realised that the only way to nuclear possession was through the creation of a domestic nuclear capability. In three decades, Libya managed to obtain the required material and advanced technical knowledge but was not yet capable of nuclear production. In 2003, before Libya reached the ultimate point of production, Libya signed a deal with the US and the UK, promising to completely eliminate its nuclear weapons program.

​The application of Cortright & Väyrynen’s framework demonstrates each factor influenced Libya’s decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program. First of all, an improved security situation can be observed in Libya, on three different levels. Firstly, the threat of Israel, that once inspired the Libyan quest for nukes, was reassessed as a diminishable risk, mainly due to Israel’s geographical distance. Secondly, Qadhafi’s failure to pursue regional leadership tempered his future regional aspirations and allowed him to enjoy the peaceful relations with Libya’s neighbours. Lastly, the security relations with the West improved significantly in the second part of the 1990s and especially after the 9/11 attacks, which convinced Libya to end its support for terrorist groups. Altogether, these three developments demonstrate a strong improvements of Libya’s security situation, influencing its perception on the necessity of protection by nuclear weapons. Secondly, moving away from Libya’s image as an inward-looking and state-oriented country, domestic demands pressured a governance change during the 1980s and 1990s. To counter domestic unrest and deteriorating economic circumstances, and effectively to guarantee regime survival, Qadhafi realised he had to change his political rationale and embark on the path of modernization and global integration. Third and finally, external incentives and pressures also influenced Libya’s decision making. The US strongly promoted non-proliferation, both by imposing strict economic sanctions and by providing positive financial incentives, which was very important for economically weak Libya. The application of the theoretical framework to Libya’s denuclearization thus empirically supports all three factors: prior to the nuclear turnaround, Libya’s security perspective improved, it experienced a substantive change in governance, and there was an abundance of incentives present to steer Libya’s decision-making. 

Kazakhstan is an entirely different story. The country acquired its weapons very uniquely: through inheritance. The dissolution of the Soviet Union made Kazakhstan the fourth largest nuclear power in the world. After a long period of negotiation, Kazakh president Nazarbayev decided to discard all the nuclear weapons on its soil, making Kazakhstan officially nuclear free in 1994. Applying the theoretical framework to Kazakhstan demonstrates that, again, all three factors informed Kazakhstan’s denuclearization. Firstly, an improvement in the security situation can be observed, although it is somewhat disputed, as Kazakhstan appeared to face a multiplicity of security threats from its powerful neighbours China and Russia. However, Kazakhstan had long-standing close ties with its neighbours and hence did not conceive them as a threat. Moreover, great powers China, Russia and the US all signed an official Security Guarantees document during the nuclear negotiations with Kazakhstan. This clearly demonstrates an improvement of Kazakhstan’s security situation. Secondly, Kazakhstan, as a newly independent state, chose to discard its Soviet legacy and build a unique Kazakh state that was oriented towards the West. This lead to a clear quest for modernization, global integration and economic development in Kazakhstan’s early years. Thirdly, both Russia and the US provided strong incentives in the shape of economic compensation to Kazakhstan, making renouncement of the nuclear weapons “literally” profitable. Additionally, Russia also exerted strong pressure on Kazakhstan, because Russia’s president Yeltsin issued a decree which “allowed Russia’s president to use nuclear forces deployed on the territory of the ex-Soviet republics without the other presidents’ prior consent”, leaving Nazarbayev little choice. In sum, the Kazakh case thus provides strong empirical support for Cortright & Väyrynen’s three factors. 

Combining the findings, it can be concluded that, despite the fact that the case studies of Libya and Kazakhstan appear to be completely different, there is a surprisingly large amount of common factors that surface through the application of Cortright and Väyrynen’s theoretical framework. Both cases demonstrate an improvement in their security position, though this is more pronounced in the Libyan case. Moreover, Libya and Kazakhstan display a political shift towards more openness and modernization prior to their denuclearization, although this shift is informed by different circumstances. Lastly, similarities can be discovered in the way that both countries were presented with a mix of beneficial incentives and strong pressure exerted by external powers. 

In sum, it becomes clear that in both cases the abdication of the nuclear weapons (program) was more beneficial in light of the domestic circumstances and the financial compensation, enabled by an improvement in the security perception. Rational calculations weighing both internal and external factors thus informed the nuclear decision-making with regards to the security and survival of states. However contrary this act of renunciation may appear to the state’s security, it is in several cases, as Libya and Kazakhstan illustrate, more advantageous for a country’s safety to denounce nuclear weapons than to retain them.

Understanding the motivations driving nuclear reversal is crucial to comprehend and advance future cases of denuclearization, because, as even Waltz and Sagan manage to agree upon, ultimately, a world without nuclear weapons is by far the safest option.

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