The Arab Uprisings ten years on: intervention, governance, narratives and identity
Layal Niazy is a MECACS intern and Saudi fourth year International Relations student at the University of St Andrews
On February 2nd, 2021 MECACS had the pleasure of hosting a roundtable discussion, commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Arab Uprisings. The speakers covered western perceptions of the uprisings; Egypt; Syria; Libya; Bahrain; and Yemen. The impressive panelists’ research findings presented during the seminar are summarized below.
Dr. Jasmine Gani is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews and Associate Director of the Centre for Syrian Studies
When the Arab uprisings began ten years ago, they represented hope and change for millions of Arabs in the region; but to what extent was that the case for onlookers in Europe and the US, and did western perceptions of events in the Middle East matter? To understand the trajectory of the uprisings and their consequences, I think we have to situate them within a global context, since domestic upheaval in the Middle East implied foreign policy upheavals for western governments. So, while the toppling of long-standing dictators was met with jubilation by Arab populations, it conversely created anxiety and fear in many western governments – bearing in mind a number of these authoritarian regimes were long-standing allies of western democracies. This was matched by the shift from an initially celebratory discourse in western commentary (in the media, among academics and politicians) to disappointment, pessimism, and disavowal of the uprisings. Within a year, newspaper editorials and academic articles were asking whether the ‘Arab Spring’ had turned into an ‘Islamist winter’, reverting to the usual narratives about the inevitability of conflict, bloodshed, and sectarianism in the Middle East. This had three implications for the direction of the uprisings: 1) it produced an unwillingness among western states to offer greater support to opposition groups they initially encouraged and emboldened in Syria, Libya, and to a lesser extent in Bahrain; 2) it applied pressure on Arab social movements to prove they were advocating the ‘right kind’ of democracy (i.e. one that conformed to a western, liberal image), or made it harder for those movements to embrace and analyze the failures and messiness that are necessary and inherent to any revolutionary process; and 3) the narrative of the ‘Islamist threat’ was successfully and brutally instrumentalized by authoritarian regimes to justify their repression of any opposition to audiences at home and abroad.
Ahmed Abozaid is a PhD Candidate at the University of St Andrews Studying Counterterrorism Laws in the Arab World from 2011-2021
After a decade since the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings (2011-2021), and in the middle of the so-called Global War on Terror, the right question to ask is not whether human rights accelerate or hinder counterterrorism efforts, but how to fight terrorism without violating human rights or crossing the line. Human rights are not a luxury, and they should be at the top of states’ priorities. This study explores critical school arguments, which consider human rights in either wartime or peacetime, are not a liability but a substantial element of any counterterrorism strategy. Having said that, it emphasizes exploring and discussing how counterterrorism discourse and practices constitute and (re)constitute as a crucial component of a larger and comprehensive system of subjugation, oppression, terrorizing, and control. Such schemes are not only seeking to take over the public sphere or political process but also and mainly to control everyday life activities. To do this, I draw upon a Foucauldian manner of the microphysics of power, which focuses on the multitude of loci of power spread throughout society: families, workplaces, everyday practices, and marginal institutions. I also analyze the myriad ways in which the subjects are constituted in different but intersecting networks, through a Deleuzian manner of “society of control”. In the Egyptian case, the main tools of such a system are practicing and performing violence and repression, both materialistically and discursively. In short, this study is about when counterterrorism, as a form of the state’s monopoly on the use of violence, turns into a form of repression and state terror. Likewise, it’s a study on the process of knowledge production about terrorism and counterterrorism, and its relationship with power, authority, and hegemony. Above all, this is a study is about the dialectic between resistance and violence.
Josephine Jackson is a PhD Candidate at the University of St Andrews Studying the International Responses to Gaddafi and Assad’s Crackdown Against the Uprisings
This presentation summarizes a selected aspect of a larger Ph.D. study on the decisions by the U.S. and UK governments to execute a militarized intervention, in accordance with the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), in Libya in 2011, but not in Syria during 2011 – 2013. The study focuses on the international responses, particularly those of the U.S. and the UK, to the Arab Spring uprisings first in Libya, followed by Syria. For the Libya case, the key factors that affected how international actors viewed the uprising were the clear threats made by Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi, to commit atrocities against civilians; the dynamics of the UN Security Council that allowed for the adoption of two resolutions that, first, imposed sanctions on the Gaddafi regime (Resolution 1970) and, second, authorized an international intervention (Resolution 1973); the alignment of national interests and values that drove the European push for intervention; and how all these factors combined shaped the U.S. response to Libya’s uprising. For the Syria case, the key factors that impacted the international responses to the uprising included the assumptions (both proven to be mistaken) that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would soon lose power and the crisis would self-correct; the extreme difficulty in addressing Syria’s crisis relative to that of Libya; and the escalatory factors inherent to the Syria case (namely, Russian benefaction; obstacles in the Security Council; the legacy of the Iraq War; and the seeming impossibility of conducting a limited intervention). It is argued that while similar factors were involved in both cases, they were perceived and acted upon differently by international actors.
Ola Rifai is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Syrian Studies who Studies Identity Balance during the Syrian Uprising
The implications of the ten-year Arab uprisings are multilayered and transnational. They look lethal at all levels: political, socio-economic and humanitarian. One of the most important implications in Syria is the collapse of identity balance among Syrians, which must be examined because of its essential role in shaping a post- conflict Syria. Prior to the uprising, identity balance that Hafiz Assad carefully crafted was composed of Arabism as an umbrella identity under which Syrianism and Islamism follow. Yet, this balance was strongly shaken just after the outbreak of the uprising. Arabism declined and even seemed to be fading. Moreover, what Chris Phillips termed as “everyday Arabism” seems to be declining due to everyday sectarianism. The polarization and manipulation of sectarian identities by many states and non-state actors empowered Islamism at the expense of Arabism. However, Syrian national identity is being reproduced as an inclusive identity for the secular and non-Muslim Syrians. Although it functioned properly for 40 years, the identity balance has collapsed with the outbreak of the uprising. The struggle for power is now between two identities: Syrianism and Islamism. Arabism as umbrella identity seems to be demising for the near future. Which one of these identities, Syrianism or Islamism, has the power to redress the balance? Which one would include all Syrians? The answer is yet to be seen.
Aisha al-Rashdi is a PhD Candidate at the University of St Andrews Studying the Usage of Sectarian Rhetoric in Bahrain and Syria during the 2011 Arab uprisings
The survival of the Bahraini regime in 2011 uprising was due to the regional military intervention, which allowed the regime to crack down on the oppositions and maintain its power. The uprising in Bahrain was not militant nor was it sectarian – at least in its early stages. The regime portrayed the uprising as such in order to delegitimize the opposition and mobilized masses, and to legitimize its use of violence against the protesters. The regime rhetoric about the uprising initially described it negatively, by labeling the protests as “bad” days and memories, not to mention as a “foreign plot” whereby Iran attempted to destabilize and topple the government. The regime’s rhetoric gradually evolved in relation to the changing regional alliances, especially with the onset of the 2017 Gulf Dispute. Later, instead of asserting that opposition leaders were stirring sectarian strife within the country, the regime began claiming that the opposition leaders have terrorist ties and that they’re colluding with Qatar. Furthermore, the regime’s replacement of the Pearl Roundabout with Al-Farooq junction represents a sectarian securitized act, which symbolizes the government’s control and power over the meaning behind the uprisings – reinforcing the narrative that the uprisings were a “failed Shi’i plot to overthrow the Sunni regime”. Nowadays,whenever the uprising anniversary grows nearer, police forces are placed around the junction and in different Shi’i villages to control and maintain the local small riots.
Marta Furlan is a PhD Candidate at the University of St Andrews Studying Civil Wars, Rebel Governance, and Salafi-Jihadism in the Middle East
In 2011, as the Arab Spring spread across the Arab world, protests also reached Yemen – a country already characterized by great state weakness. As Yemen’s population took to the streets of Sana’a in February 2011, the government adopted a heavy-handed response that further incensed the opposition. This context characterized by weak state power, insecurity, and volatility turned into a golden opportunity for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – the al-Qaeda affiliate based in Yemen. Indeed, AQAP’s leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi saw in the unfolding disorder an unmissable opportunity for his group to build an Islamic Emirate. Shortly afterwards, AQAP created Ansar al-Sharia as its insurgent arm and expanded throughout southern Yemen. After conquering territories, AQAP proclaimed an Islamic emirate and engaged in activities of governance: it provided gas, water, and electricity; guaranteed security; provided (mostly Quranic) education; repaired infrastructure; engaged in the resolution of disputes according to sharia; imposed new norms of behavior and created a hisba police to enforce compliance. Thus, what was observed in Yemen as protests spread across the country was a textbook definition of state weakness, which is the necessary pre-condition for armed groups to wage an insurgency, conquer territories, and rule them. This phenomenon, known as rebel governance, was observed in the context of the Arab Spring also in other countries, such as Libya and Syria. The Arab Spring, in fact, opened a space of state weakness that many groups managed to exploit to establish their own systems of rule.
Here is a link to the recording of the roundtable discussion: