Shivan Fazil – Iraq’s ethnoreligious minorities: Exclusion from power-sharing grand bargains

Shivan Fazil is a senior researcher at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani’s (AUIS). Prior to joining IRIS, he was a researcher with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute based in Stockholm. His work focuses on governance, state-society relations and peace and conflict dynamics in Iraq and spans a decade working with, amongst others, SIPRI (2020-2024), United States Institute of Peace (2019-2020), Oxfam GB (2017), and Middle East Research Institute (2015-2016). He tweets @ShivanFazil

Introduction 

This summer will mark a somber anniversary. 10 years since the Islamic state group rampaged through northern Iraq and committed a genocide against Yezidis.  A decade on, Yezidi and other minorities pursuit for justice remain elusive and demand for recognition and inclusion on the political and societal level is still far from reach. 

Iraq’s ethnoreligious minorities are scattered across the northern part of the country in the provinces of Nineveh, Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah al-Din. 

After the adoption of the 2005 Constitution, these provinces became known as the disputed territories – a 300-mile-long swath of territory with ethnically diverse districts, that mark the transition zone between Arab and Kurdish Iraq, and which stretches from the Iranian to the Syrian border. 

Since then, minorities have been caught on the one hand in between the Federal Government of Iraq’s and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s disputes and between the rival political blocs vying for influence and domination in both Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan region on the other. 

The two government’s ongoing competition for administrative authority in the disputed territories has been partly responsible for the failure to deliver on the needs of the local population and gradually increasing insecurity and tensions, including between minorities.  

Seeds of Discord

After the 1975 collapse of the Kurdish nationalist movement that had achieved the Iraqi-Kurdish autonomy agreement of 1970 and recognized Kurdish cultural and political rights, the Baath regime engaged in deliberate and systematic plans to ensure its control over the area.  This was through the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kurds and other minorities, destruction of Kurdish villages and appropriation of lands belonging to Kurds, Turkmen and other minorities. Moreover, the regime forced non-Arab ethnic minorities to identify as Arabs through a policy of ‘nationality correction’. 

This was part of a broader policy of Arabization campaign involving driving out Kurds and ethnoreligious minorities (such as Assyrians, Armenians, Mandeans, Shabaks, Turkmen, Yezidis etc.) from these provinces and replacing them with Arab families that were given agricultural tenant contracts. The policy also entailed ethnic gerrymandering of administrative boundaries of these provinces and imposing restrictions on minorities’ languages and sociocultural expressions, such as right to self-identification.  

As such, the Ba’ath regime’s policies planted the seeds of further discord and deepened existing tensions and historical cleavages among the various ethnic, religious and cultural groups in the country. It also pitted different communities against one another: Arabs against Kurds, Muslims against non-Muslims, Shia versus Sunni, and the majority versus minority.  

The Grand Bargain 

The 2005 Constitution aimed to heal divisions and redress past injustices by means of a consensual political system. The constitution guarantees full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice, and commitment to personal status according to religion, sect, belief or choice. The apportionment of the government bureaucracy along the ethno-sectarian groups introduced after the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq, however set the stage for the domination of the main groups; Shia, Sunni and Kurds to the detriment and erasure of ethnoreligious minorities. More than two decades on, ethnoreligious minorities still lack recognition (and inclusion) on the political and societal level, and are increasingly caught up in the broader Arab-Kurdish struggle in Iraq. 

Al Qosh Monastery: Source: Sarah Edgcumbe

Recognition and inclusion on the political level, which includes being mentioned in constitution and legislations, is seen widely as being important for political representation under the ethno-sectarian political system. Ethnoreligious minorities see the allocation of quota seats on the national and subnational level as recognition of their communities, how these seats are contested however remains a big issue.

Repeated pleas to limit the right to elect quota seats to voters from ethnoreligious communities have largely gone unanswered. This has allowed the powerful non-minority blocs to simply snatch and take up the quota seats reserved ostensibly to give representation to minorities.

Worse still, the subsequent turmoil and insecurities that ensued were exploited by extremist  organizations, like the Islamic State (IS) group and its predecessor Al-Qaeda, to target minorities – whose numbers have been in decline since. 

In 2014, IS targeted ethnoreligious minorities –  particularly those of non-Abrahamic faiths in Nineveh, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious province that is home to Assyrians, Chaldeans, Kakai, Shabak, Syriac, Turkmen and Yezidi communities. IS rule in northern Iraq between 2014-2017 entailed the forced conversion, enslavement and execution of these minorities. IS attacks on the Yezidi community in Sinjar district were so devastating that they have been recognized as a genocide by the United Kingdom and Germany.

Enduring Suffering 

Although conflict and violence has abated since the territorial defeat of IS and Iraq is enjoying its most stable period over the past two decades, structural violence endures. In addition to grappling with the ramifications of conflict, ethnoreligious minorities continue to suffer. 

They live on the margins of society and its structures with mere symbolic representation in the national and subnational governments and councils; frozen social mobility and constant stigmatization as negative stereotypes remain abound and espoused as facts. They are treated with disdain, and their cultural resources and practices are viewed with derision and bear the brunt of hate speech and different forms of prejudice that stem primarily from common misconceptions, misrepresentation as well as disregard for diversity and inclusion. 

For example, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s ruling in February 2024 that effectively abolished the quota seats reserved for minorities in the Kurdistan region’s parliament ignited a wave of hate speech on social media and exposed Turkmen and Christian (Chaldean, Assyrian and Syriac) minorities to a barrage of abuse and ridicule. 

Lalish: Source: Sarah Edgcumbe 

Moreover, Kaka’i and (some) Yezidi men are often distinguishable from others by their long moustaches; growing a moustache symbolizes devotion and piety among Kaka’is, and manhood and boldness for Yezidis — although it is no longer strictly adhered to. This tradition, however, is not well understood and can be seen as unhygienic among other communities. As a result, Yezidis and Kaka’is can still become the subject of derogatory comments or insults, both in person and on social media, for their long moustaches.

In 2023, Yezidis were the target of a campaign of hate speech and false accusation which included rhetoric that condoned the crimes that IS committed against the community along with harmful tropes about devil worship.

As the Yezidis will soon mark the somber tenth anniversary of IS atrocities, their pursuit of justice and accountability remain elusive. The UN mission investigating  IS genocide and war crimes is facing an imminent closure even though thousands of Yezidi women and girls are either missing or remain in captivity. The Yazidi (female) Survivors Law remains merely an ‘ink on paper’ with survivors increasingly questioning the government’s commitment to deliver long-awaited and overdue reparations promised under the law. The broader Yezidi community is languishing in displacement camps, with an impending camps’ closure looming large while their ancestral town of Sinjar embroiled in a transnational conflict hub impeding stability and returns. 

Image Title: Defend International Reaches out to Yazidis, Source: Wikimedia Commons, Licensed by: CC BY 2.0

The 2020 UN sponsored Sinjar agreement between the two governments has failed to bring about any progress in stabilizing the district and facilitating returns. A clear reminder that peace processes need to be inclusive and that without an effective and meaningful political participation, ethnoreligious minorities cannot raise their communities’ issues and concerns. It is also an indication of the degree of recognition (or lack thereof) and inclusion of these communities.

Conclusion

Popular recognition on the societal level however is tainted by stereotypes and misconceptions that fuel hate speech and discrimination particularly when political tensions are high. They shape the lived experience of minorities with implications daily.  Adequate recognition entails dispelling common misconceptions, correcting stereotypes, and tackling the deeply ingrained prejudices against minorities to ensure equality and inclusion on the broader societal level. 

The federal government would need to enact relevant legislation to fulfill its commitment to respect diversity and preserve pluralism through the promotion of minorities inclusion in public life and ensuring the right to effective political representation – not just mere symbolic reserved seats. This should be combined with support for grassroot efforts that seek to promote social cohesion and tolerance through interfaith dialogue, tackling hate speech and misinformation.

Addressing the marginalization that ethnoreligious minorities have endured requires redressing the root causes of their suffering and erasure. Placing more emphasis on respect for diversity, human rights and civic education could help contribute to the consolidation of values of citizenship and the formation of a national identity that bridges parochial differences. This is also in line with grassroots and civil society groups struggling to reimagine Iraqi politics where identity, including ethnicity and sect, play a much smaller role. This is however a struggle against mounting odds.  

Finally, the disputed territories remain a flashpoint in the absence of a post IS settlement between the two governments. The current relative stability should be utilized to revive the mediation efforts on these areas and to prevent Iraq to decent into instability again.